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Abstract
We have not clearly acknowledged the abstraction from unpriceable “social goods” (derived from
communities) which, different from private and public goods, simply disappear if it is attempted to
market them. Separability from markets and economics has not been argued, much less established.
Acknowledging communities would reinforce rather than undermine them, and thus facilitate
the production of social goods. But it would also help economics by facilitating our understanding
of – and response to – financial crises as well as environmental destruction and many social problems,
and by reducing the alienation from economics often felt by students and the public.
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All theorems of economics are necessarily
valid in every instance in which all the assump-
tions presupposed are given. Of course, they
have no practical significance in situations
where these conditions are not present. von
Mises (1963:66)
I. The importance of acknowledging
the assumptions
Those of us who believe that economics is reality-
based – i.e., a science intending to have some objec-
tive grounding in and bearing on the real world – may
feel insulted when economics is referred to
 as a game that economists play (Fisher 1989;
Bloor and Bloor 1993:158,164; McCloskey
2002:37-48);
 as pure mathematics (Rosenberg 1994a) or as
mathematical politics (Rosenberg 1992, 1994b);
 as ideology (Ward 1979; Solow 1994; Klamer
2001:70); as mythology (Perelman 2006); as the-
ology (Benton 1990; Nelson 1991; Boli 1995;
Simons 1995); or as religion (Dunbar 1995:161);
 as autism (Devine 2002; and the Post-Autistic
Economics Network more generally);
 or as a form of brain damage (Hazel Henderson,
quoted by Streeten 2004:2).
We maintain that the assumptions underlying
economic analysis can be used for determining the
boundary conditions of a model (Dunbar 1995:99),
as diagnostic tools for counteracting discrepancies
of reality from theory, i.e., for correcting mar-
ket imperfections (Sutton 2000). Samuelson and
Nordhaus (1995:30-37), among many others, use
this diagnostic approach to explore the appropri-
ateness of particular government interventions in
markets. But how can we be sure that we have
identified and analyzed all the important market
imperfections, if we haven’t clearly specified all
the fundamental assumptions? And the problem
extends beyond that. As Weintraub (1991:1) notes,
If the [general equilibrium] theory has defects,
then the centerpiece of neoclassical economics
may be flawed, and the larger enterprise may
be suspect.
II. We get utility from social goods
derived from communities
Landsburg (1997:160) notes that “other people –
our friends and our children and sometimes even
strangers who do us unexpected kindnesses – are
among the luxuries that make life worth living,”
Economics Department, Handelsho¨gskolan, Go¨teborgs Universitet, Box 640 SE-40530 Go¨teborg, Sverige
(Sweden). int+46-31-218743. Rick.Wicks@economics.gu.se
78 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIST
and McCloskey (1998:302) says “I get utility
because I love (not the other way around).” My
specific concern here is with this utility that Lands-
burg implies, and McCloskey refers to.
Feminist economists have recently directed atten-
tion to this issue again, though the fact that econom-
ics overlooks the social fabric of human relations
has been pointed out for well over a century. There
is an entire category of producer organizations in
“civil society” that economic theory largely over-
looks, and an entire category of goods that they
produce: Communities (social groups based on kin-
ship, location, or belief, such as families, neighbor-
hoods, and religious groups) provide utility directly
(unmediated by markets or governments) to their
members (those who identify with and participate
in them) via unpriced, unpriceable (untradeable)
social goods (Wicks 2009).
Social goods include
 a sense of identity (Buchanan 1978:366;
Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Bendle 2002; Cowen
2002:131,136);
 meaning and purpose (Iannaccone 1998:1480-81);
 love and companionship (Lewis, Amini, and
Lannon, 2000; Lane 2000:9 and Part III);
 the sense of affirmation, recognition, and power
that accompany entrepreneurship (Trigilia
2002:43);
 social cohesion and stability (Seabright 2004);
 social sustainability more broadly, for example
through the birthing and nurturing of children
(King 2003); and even
 feelings of belonging, esteem, self-expression,
and intellectual and esthetic satisfaction (Maslow
1954:chs. 5 and 8; Wallach and Wallach
1983:130-2; Wilson 1991:242).
Social goods are thus clearly valuable – by
revealed preference – to those who expend time,
energy, and money in developing and maintaining
membership in communities in order to obtain
them (Ackerman et al. 1997; Bakshi 2004). So it’s
obvious that social goods affect behavior, though
not primarily market behavior (cf. Prasch 2003).
And if the preferences of entrepreneurs – who
are also consumers – include social goods (as they
must), then we must even re-explore the whole
notion of profit and what motivates entrepreneurs
in the first place (Bakan 2003). It seems unlikely
that Bill Gates, for example, is motivated to earn
more financial profits solely in order to purchase
more in the market; he has said as much himself,
and has demonstrated it with his philanthropy.
Of course, besides social goods, communities
also produce social capital, which facilitates mar-
kets (and governments). For Putnam (1995, 2000)
social capital refers to civic engagement and trust,
whereas in labor economics it seems to refer more
to information resources available through per-
sonal networks. Ethos (an aspect of social capital)
is – somewhat similarly to social goods – an “unpriced,
untraded input into production” (Cowen 2002:49,
italics added). Becker and Murphy (2000:9) take a
different approach, in which – somewhat anom-
alously, given the analogy to physical capital –
social capital affects the utility function directly.
But Becker’s and Murphy’s focus is on “market
behavior where social interactions are important”
(p. 6, italics added), rather than – as here – on
social behavior where market interactions (and
market theory) are important.
The value of social goods far exceeds just the
indirect, instrumental contribution of communities
(via social capital) to the functioning of markets
and governments. How much would you have to
be paid to live in a world without communities
(no families, no neighbors, no fellow believers, etc.),
even if – magically – markets (and government)
still worked? Would you want to argue that
what Iannaccone (1998:1475) calls “economically
important social behavior” – such as criminal
activity; drug and alcohol consumption; physical
and mental health; and marriage, fertility, and
divorce – are only economically important? That
is, that these behaviors are only important because
of their impact on markets and on utility derived
from market (or even public) goods? (Definitions
of “economics” will be discussed more below.)
All this is not to say that communities – which
produce social goods (and social capital) – are
themselves always good, or can’t produce “social
bads.” Bauman (2001:4,5,20), for example, stresses
that the security provided by communities comes
at a cost of freedom. In-group cooperation also
often comes at a cost of destructive out-group
competition (Shermer 2003). Nevertheless, without
commoditizing love and kindness (Anderson 1990),
we might grant that, even if we were totally self-
interested, we could (paradoxically) still derive util-
ity from social goods produced in communities.
The term “social goods” has also been used –
quite inappropriately, in my opinion – for what are
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now more generally referred to as “public goods”
(e.g., Bowen 1943:27-8; Musgrave 1969, 1986;
Lindbeck 1972:680). And there have been other
usages of the term “social” – for collective welfare
(as in “social welfare” and the ubiquitous “social
welfare function”), or for comparison goods (Durkin
1999) – usages which also haven’t reflected its
full meaning. The usage here does so, I suggest, and
thus seems more appropriate.
Otherwise, as Mirowski (1994:54) says: “What is
so ‘social’ about social science?” Myrdal (1969:42)
noted a trend towards “scientism,” of social scien-
tists increasingly using “strange terminology.” And
Varian (2001:133) admits, “I hate to say it, but
economist terminology is terrible.” It seems better,
when possible, to let words mean what they nor-
mally mean. As Hahn (1984:8) says,
There are. . . those who believe that defini-
tions and language do not much matter as
long as they are consistently employed, [but]
definitions. . . have an immediate and potent
influence on the analysis which follows, and
language has enormous potential for good
or ill.
III. Communities are the “third sphere”
of society
Communities producing social goods are the fun-
damental social sphere out of which governments
and markets sprang and which they both serve
(Boulding 1969:10, 1978, 1985, 1990; Boulding,
Boulding, and Burgess 1980; Inglehart 1997; Lane
2000:332; see also Pepperday 2009). Whether com-
munities could be formed or maintained solely as a
result of the rational maximization of self-interest –
as imagined by Becker (1976, 1991), Elster (1989),
Stark (1999), Bergstrom (1997), Iannaccone (1998),
and Platteau (2000) – has not been demonstrated
(Ferber and Nelson 2003:45-8), and doesn’t actually
seem possible.
Many (such as Boulding, 1969) have thus argued
that economics is wrong to focus only on ratio-
nal maximization, but should instead embrace a
“multiple-utility conception” (Etzioni 1986), includ-
ing a “moral utility” or what Sen (1977) calls “com-
mitment,” that underlies the “heroic, altruistic, or
even irrational” deeds which Baumol (1970:23)
believes can shape history. Fiske (1991, 2004)
explains how “market pricing” (economic) motiva-
tion fits into this larger and more humane set of
motivations. Wicks (2009) relates Fiske’s four moti-
vations – which Fiske calls relational models or
modes (RMs) – to the three spheres of society: mar-
kets, governments, and communities; and to their
production of, respectively, private, public, and
social goods.
As is well known, prior to publishing The Wealth
of Nations in 1776, Adam Smith had devoted an
entire earlier work – The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments (published in 1759) – to the social sphere of
communities and social goods. Smith’s intended
(but unfinished) third major work, on the political
system – mentioned in Smith (1984:342 and the
Advertisement therein) – would have completed his
trilogy on this tripartite social-economic-political
world in which we live. Minowitz (1993) explores
Smith’s understanding of this tripartite system.
Commons (1990:55-69) analyzed economic trans-
actions (the transfer of ownership rights) in terms
of three similar types and principles. Dasgupta
(1995:105) is one of many modern economists who
find the same fundamental tripartite classification of
social reality useful, as does
 Temin (2006:137,149) in analyzing the econ-
omy of the early Roman empire;
 Duby (1980) in understanding feudal society;
 Esping-Andersen (1999) in analyzing the social
foundations of postindustrial economics;
 Steiner (1922) in predicting the future of soci-
ety; and even
 Mithen (1996:54) in understanding the prehis-
tory of the mind.
Adaman and Madra (2002) also used the term
“third sphere” for communities, although their
focus is more on tradeables given as gifts, rather
than, as here, on untradeable social goods.
IV. Social goods are different from private
and public goods, but are un-analyzed
Tetlock, McGraw, and Kristel (2004) explain
why the things that Arrow (1997) calls “invaluable
goods” shouldn’t be sold, but there seems to have
been no theoretical discussion of goods – such as
love and companionship and the other social goods
listed above – which, though they provide private
benefits, disappear (or change unrecognizably) if
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marketed or even evaluated monetarily, and are
thus inherently unpriceable and can’t be sold and
are thus radically different from true private goods.
Frey and Eichenberger (1996:192) and Frey
(1997) got close to social goods without categoriz-
ing them theoretically, nor did Johansson-Stenman
(1998). England and Folbre (2003:65-74) discuss a
variety of contracting problems – including miss-
ing and incomplete markets due to missing agents
or externalities; monitoring and enforcement pro-
blems; and endogenous preferences – but even
they never discuss social goods per se as discussed
here. All these careful analysts are certainly aware
of social goods, as is any normal human being
(McCloskey 2000a also explores them descrip-
tively) – but social goods seem to be too obvious
to have elicited theoretical attention.
Though social goods have some private-good
characteristics, they cannot be produced for mar-
kets like true private goods (Fiske 1997:256: “to
compare is to destroy”), but social goods are also
different from public goods or even club goods
(Cornes and Sandler 1996): Though they may well
have public-goods aspects (such as externalities),
they have primarily private benefits, and thus have
not been analyzed in public economics (e.g., Myles
1995). Communities – and thus social goods – also
cannot be adequately provided by governments,
which most discussions assume at least implicitly
of public goods (e.g., Jha 1998:Parts II-IV).
V. The Wealth of Nations began the
treatment of social goods as separable
from economics
What is economics (Ma¨ki 2001a:4-9)? This ques-
tion is “a lot less banal than it seems, for the ways
in which we answer it will profoundly affect the
method[s] thought to be appropriate for economists
to use” (Kristol 1981:203). “The specification of
what it is that precisely constitutes the economy is
not so abstract or removed from practical conse-
quences” (Mirowski 1994:70).
Can economic analysis be empirically relevant
if it doesn’t include things as fundamental as com-
munities and social goods? It would seem that – to
be thorough and honest – it would at least need to
abstract from them by clear, explicit assumption.
There is no theoretical justification for treating com-
munities and social goods as totally separable –
outside the disciplinary boundaries of economics –
without discussion.
Adam Smith addressed “sympathy” (what we
would now more likely call empathy) in The
Theory of Moral Sentiments, as noted above. When
he later focused on economics in The Wealth of
Nations, he took the social sphere of communities
as given, for the most part, because the “blowback”
effects of markets – and economics – on commu-
nities were not yet clear (though he famously
pointed out the destructive effects of specialization
on workers). Thus social goods have been implicit-
ly treated as separable from market goods – and
ignorable in economics – ever since The Wealth
of Nations.
But Walras, who originated the general-
equilibrium approach, actually intended to deal with
“social wealth”: The subtitle of his Elements of Pure
Economics (1954) is in fact The Theory of Social
Wealth, by which Walras (p. 65, original italics)
meant “all things, material or immaterial. . . that
are scarce, that is to say, on the one hand, useful
to us and, on the other hand, only available to us
in limited quantity.” Nevertheless Walras left out
social goods, which – though immaterial – are both
useful to us, as we’ve discussed, and scarce. His
economics was thus “devoid of any serious empiri-
cal content” (Mirowski 1990:193). Walras’ analysis
might have lacked serious empirical content even
if he had included communities and social goods,
but at least he would then have provided a more
complete (i.e., a more general) framework on
which to hang empirical details.
But since Walras, only private and public goods
have been included in economic welfare-analysis
(e.g., Boadway and Bruce 1984). Stiglitz (1997:
Parts I and II; 2010:241) gives an introduction to
the general-equilibrium assumptions underlying
welfare analysis, while Arrow (1983) – summar-
ized in the attached Appendix – gives a careful
technical presentation, but neither Stiglitz nor
Arrow includes communities and social goods. As
noted earlier, Samuelson and Nordhaus (1995:30-
37) discuss many types of market imperfections,
also with no mention of communities and social
goods. (An introductory text that is much more
aware of communities and social goods is Stretton,
1999.) Moss (1973) recognizes social goods
empirically, especially the chapter by Juster and
the one by Ruggles and Ruggles, though none
address the theoretical issues raised here.
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VI. Separability has not been established,
nor even argued
Social goods are omitted (without acknowledg-
ment) in the fundamental assumptions of partial
equilibrium analysis – and thus their implications
have not been analyzed in basic microeconomic
theory at all – but the omission of social goods
shows up most clearly in general equilibrium anal-
ysis, when we claim to be discussing all sources of
utility. Of course the omission of social goods
would be justifiable if they are entirely separable
(Leontief 1947) from markets and from the broader
concerns of economic analysis – that is, if social
goods didn’t affect markets, and markets didn’t
affect them – but that case hasn’t been established,
in fact it hasn’t even been argued.
Pigou (1962:12) recognized this potential prob-
lem when he pointed out generally that
there is no guarantee that the effects pro-
duced on the part of welfare that can be
brought into relation with the measuring rod
of money may not be cancelled by effects of
a contrary kind brought about in other parts
or aspects of welfare; and if this happens, the
practical usefulness of our conclusions is
wholly destroyed.
But this caveat has not been followed up. What
are those “other parts or aspects of welfare”?
(Should we compare them to the monetarily-mea-
surable ones, and how would we measure them, if
so?) Thus those parts or aspects have been largely
ignored. Pigou’s insight has not been expressed in
the fundamental assumptions of microeconomics,
nor has it been incorporated into welfare economics,
nor discussed in the conclusions of general or partial
analyses based upon them.
Hirschman (1982) analyzed possible interactions
between markets and society – positive or negative,
either way – though he didn’t specifically highlight
communities and social goods as the “third sphere”
of society. Of course communities – through social
capital, often via ritual (Chwe 2001) – can help to
solve collective-action (coordination) problems of
markets (and of governance), as already discussed.
But there are also contrary effects, of markets, eco-
nomics, and market ideology on the social sphere of
communities and social goods.
Markets can certainly have positive effects on
communities and social goods, for example by
increasing the possibilities for travel and commu-
nication over distances previously unimagined. I’m
from Alaska, and I met my wife, who is Swedish,
in Bangladesh – thanks, among other things, to
commercial communications systems and airlines.
Commercial social networking sites are now ubiq-
uitous on the Internet.
But despite thus facilitating communities and
social goods, the development of markets and the
production of private goods for them might also
damage communities – at least relative to what
those communities could otherwise be – and might
thus reduce the production of social goods. Or so,
at any rate, all these recent observers would have
us believe:
Weisskopf 1955:140-42; Polanyi 1968;
Burenstam Linder 1970; Hirsch 1976, espe-
cially Part II on commodity bias and commer-
cialization bias; Bell 1976; Fusfeld 1985:50;
Etzioni 1988; Plumb 1988; Bowles 1991:12-
13, 1998:105; Mishan 1993, especially Book
Two, The Social Consequences; Simons 1995:
xvii,ch. 3; Putnam 1995, 2000:187; Goodwin,
Ackerman, and Kiron 1997; Giddens 1998:15;
Frank 1999:88; Fukuyama 1999:5-6,250-52;
Johnson and Earle 2000:251,376; Lane
2000:9; Myers 2000; Ciscel and Heath 2001;
Kamarck 2001:26,84,99; Stiglitz 2002:56,74,247;
2003:293,303,319; Harris and Johnson 2003:
322; Roccas and McCauley 2004:269-70; and
of courseMarx 1986:457-8.
That advertising can contribute to the commodi-
fication (commercialization) of many aspects of life
formerly reserved to communities is well known
(McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb 1982; Heilbroner
1985:118; Fine and Leopold 1997) – with both
positive and negative effects. Even the study of eco-
nomics can damage communities and thus the pro-
duction of social goods (Marwell and Ames 1981;
Wallach and Wallach 1983; Schwartz 1987: 52;
Cohen 1991:269-70; Frank, Gilovich, and Regan
1993; Stiglitz 2002:220-21; Marglin 2007).
Whether such negative welfare-effects of mar-
kets and of economics itself on communities and
the production of social goods (however those
effects might be measured) outweigh the positive
effects, or vice-versa, is not the question here.
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Markets (or economics) are certainly not inherently
or even predominately bad. But amelioration of
their negative effects will only be possible once
those negative effects are recognized. McCloskey
(2000b) is justifiably concerned with “oomph,” but
it thus suffices here that negative effects are possi-
ble; that many careful observers believe they are
substantial; and that we might be able to amelio-
rate them without substantially injuring markets.
The question is not markets or no markets (nor is
it economics or not), but markets and economics
while recognizing only economic thinking, or mar-
kets and economics while also recognizing other
relational modes – in particular, those fostering
communities and the production of social goods
(Wicks 2009).
VII. The unacknowledged abstraction
from communities and social goods causes
many methodological problems
The spirit of economics “consists in looking not
merely at the immediate but at. . . longer effects. . .,
and consists in tracing. . . consequences. . . not
merely for one group but for all groups” (Econom-
ics in One Lesson, Henry Hazlitt 1946, cited by
Simon and Simon, 1993:24). This spirit is vio-
lated by the unacknowledged abstraction from
communities and social goods.
[There is] a kind of hypocrisy of the dis-
course that leads important issues. . . to appear
in only covert ways. The official style of con-
temporary economics seems to exclude a wide
range of . . . traditional moral, social, and
policy questions about economic choices. . . .
[T]hese excluded forms of discourse have not
vanished; they have just become hidden, mak-
ing their discussion fragmentary and insuffi-
cient. Bazerman (1988:279)
Many are concerned with equilibrium (as in
general equilibrium), but my concern is whether –
when it leaves out communities and social goods –
analysis is sufficiently general. If economics were
only about prices, productivity, and profits, etc., why
do textbooks typically start by discussing maxi-
mization over preference sets very generally –
choice under conditions of scarcity – “human
behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce
means which have alternative uses” (Robbins
1932:15)? Does economics intend to be general
(as in general equilibrium)? Even when people are
in “economic mode,” deciding on marginal invest-
ments of money, time, and energy, one of the
choices (paradoxically) is to devote more to com-
munities and the production of social goods.
“Good theories avoid harmful falsehoods” (Ma¨ki
2001b:384), and “the claims of community have
to be taken seriously” (McCloskey 1990:159).
Abstracting from social goods without clear expla-
nation is “unjustifiably narrow” (Ma¨ki 2001b:373),
it’s not “the way the world works” (371), it is
“unrealistic in a wrong way” (372). It cuts reality
in the middle of a “bone” (utility) while pretending
to cut at a joint (markets, or market thinking more
generally). “Walrasian analysis is [thus] partial”
(Ma¨ki 1994:243), not general.
Of course all modeling is unrealistic in some
way, and it might not even be possible to make
explicit every single thing which is abstracted
from. But what’s being expressed here is an “engi-
neering attitude”: To be useful in practice, models
must acknowledge important elements which
are being ignored. Communities and social goods
are important elements, yet economic theory
ignores them without acknowledging that fact
clearly and thoroughly.
When we abstract from social goods and the com-
munities from which we derive them, we have thus
not thoroughly represented our fundamental assump-
tions. We’ve been practicing “assumption without
representation.” And consequently we haven’t
analyzed – haven’t even identified – communities
and social goods as possible sources of “market
imperfections.” (It’s odd to refer to “the presence
of communities and social goods” as a market
imperfection – as though we would be better off
without them – but that’s how our theory works.)
If effects on communities and social goods haven’t
been considered as market imperfections, how can
we devise policies to optimize welfare?
The problem has become more acute as main-
stream (“neoclassical”) economic theory – “the
general equilibrium approach” or “neo-Walrasian
research program” (Weintraub 1985) also known
as “Samuelsonian economics” (McCloskey 2006:
ch.6) – has become more mathematicized, abstract,
and “rigorous.” Revisiting the problem is impor-
tant for honest teaching as well as for accurate
public understanding of both economic theory and
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economic results, especially benefit/cost analyses.
There are methodological problems with
 advocacy versus objectivity (Furner 1975;
Ferber and Nelson 2003:vii);
 theoretical rigor and completeness (an “internal
critique,” Hodgson 2004:9);
 truth versus precision (Mayer 1993);
 and even intellectual honesty.
Compared to machines which physically block
interfering forces and thus do “honest toil,” theo-
retical models – which simply (but explicitly)
abstract from unwanted influences – have “the
advantages of theft” (Dupre´ 2001:317). How honest
then would be an unacknowledged abstraction –
an assumption without representation? We have
been dishonest with our students – unintentionally,
no doubt – as well as with our public-policy clients,
and with the public itself.
VIII. Acknowledging the abstraction from
communities and social goods
Specifying that we’re only dealing with private
goods wouldn’t make the abstraction from social
goods clear, because many of them (as noted) have
private-good characteristics, though often with
externalities (and they’re not marketable in any
case). It would be better to specify that we’re only
dealing with marketable goods, but the importance
of public goods has long been recognized, way
before techniques were constructed for analyzing
problems with them.
Markets – and, more generally, rational (self-
interested) choice under conditions of scarcity, and
even “provisioning” (a third possible definition of
the subject of economics) – have effects on commu-
nities and social goods, as discussed above. Thus to
study the full effects of choice under scarcity – or
even just of markets (or provisioning) – we must
acknowledge the utility that we obtain from social
goods produced by communities.
“A more humane balance among the three
cultural processes that shape our lives” (Bodley
2001:22) is required, a broader view of economics,
recognizing not just markets and government, but
also the sphere of communities producing social
goods. Anyone who understands optimization
knows that there can be too much or too little
(Mishan 1986:283) – in this case, too much
emphasis on markets (and government), too little
on communities and social goods.
Communities and social goods are probably
“factors that are of substantial importance, but are
intrinsically unmeasurable” (Sutton 2000:33). We
could apply conventional rational-maximization
modeling to them nevertheless, but it would be
inaccurate (Sen 1977). It would also be destructive
of communities and social goods (Marglin 2007),
so should be avoided (unless heavily qualified).
But correcting this “blind spot” (Scott 1998:294)
should be fairly simple. Briefly but clearly discuss-
ing the fact that there is also utility derived directly
from social goods produced through identification
with, and participation in, communities would be
sufficient – while explaining that, besides facilitat-
ing communities and their production of social
goods, market developments may also damage
them, reducing that utility – and that we are explic-
itly abstracting from these possibilities.
Thus specifying the nature of at least some of
Pigou’s (1962) “parts or aspects of welfare” (the
parts having to do with communities and social
goods) should thus be incorporated into the funda-
mental assumptions of partial and general equilib-
rium – and in related models and empirical welfare
analysis – and in the conclusions of such analyses.
The abstraction from communities and social
goods should also be stressed in introductions to
these topics, and in introductory economics texts.
Acknowledging social goods is important, even if
we can’t calculate “how they affect the model.”
Introducing communities and social goods in
a (non-standard) theoretical model might also be
possible, or using an empirical approach (case
studies or experiments) to show their importance
for economic analysis. But specialization and
exchange (Smith 1776; Seabright 2004) apply to
economics as well, so I defer to those with com-
parative advantage in those areas. My focus here is
only on logical completeness and on the other
methodological problems discussed above. Better
models with better explanations of observed
behavior – and with significant policy implications –
have in any case been previously demonstrated
(Titmuss 1970; Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Folbre
2001:especially Part I).
Qualitatively, the first steps to remedy the prob-
lem are thus
 acknowledging the fundamental importance of
communities and social goods;
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 acknowledging their relevance for markets and
for economics; and
 acknowledging the assumption excluding them
from typical economic analysis.
IX. The benefits of explicitly
acknowledging communities and
social goods
Economics likes to see itself as exact and sepa-
rate from other social sciences (Hausman 1992), and
there are certainly ideological pressures and incen-
tives (Ward 1979; Solow 1994; Klamer 2001:70).
This may explain why economists haven’t already
acknowledged the importance of communities and
social goods, given the large potential gains from
doing so.
We haven’t incorporated communities and social
goods into our models and analyzed the implica-
tions. Nor have we clearly abstracted from commu-
nities and social goods by explicitly assuming them
away. Modeling them with due respect for their
unique characteristics would be difficult, while it
would be undesirable to do so without that respect,
i.e., only considering “market motives”, i.e., under
rational maximization of self-interest.
But the importance and relevance of commu-
nities and social goods can only be ignored at risk
to the honesty and public acceptance of economics.
Modern western political philosophy – with
Machiavelli – turned away from the classical aware-
ness of morality (concern for others) towards self-
interest simultaneously with the rise of markets.
Hobbes and Locke then led to Adam Smith
(Strauss 1959) and then of course onwards to
hyper-rational neoclassical economics. With the
“unraveling of the Newtonian synthesis” in relativ-
ity and quantum mechanics in the 20th century, the
similar “modern project” in physics (and philoso-
phy) broke down (Toulmin 1992:139, 2001; Carey
1999:9). The growing literature on “what’s wrong
with economics” –
Ward 1972; Sen 1977, 1979; Bell and Kristol
1981; Etzioni 1988; Benton 1990; Boulding
1992; Rosenberg 1992, 1994a, 1994b; Ormerod
1994; Keen 2001; Ackerman 2002; Devine
2002; Ferber and Nelson 2003; Fullbrook 2004;
Streeten 2004; Ackerman et al. 2004; Lee and
Keen 2004
– reflects the perception of many economists of a
similar breakdown in our field. Zohar (1990)
explores freedom and creativity in a new quantum
psychology. A similar willingness to deal with
genuine uncertainty – as, for example, would
be introduced by allowing for incommensurable
social goods produced by communities – would
benefit economics. Akerlof and Shiller’s (2009)
“animal spirits” could then be understood
as (largely) manifestations of Fiske’s (1991, 2004)
other relational modes (besides market pricing),
rather than ad hoc, as dei ex machina.
Acknowledging the importance of social goods
that we derive from communities would also
increase understanding of the role and genesis of
social capital. A question desperately in need of
attention – because of its importance in American
political debate – is how does social capital get
paid for? If – in a typical production function –
revenues are totally distributed among wages of
labor, rental of land, and profits of (physical or
financial) capital, there is no obligation of busi-
ness to support communities (including govern-
ments, which can then be seen as a “cancer” on
the “productive” market agents). But when the
role of communities is fully acknowledged, it
becomes clear that it’s not all “our money”, but
rather that there is a foundation – besides extor-
tion – for paying taxes that support government
and communities.
As noted above, it has been classically demon-
strated that incorporating communities and social
goods can lead to better models and better expla-
nations of observed behavior, as well as to better
policy recommendations. But until we acknowl-
edge this possibility in a general way, we are hin-
dering the production of such models and the
generation of such policy-recommendations.
Attempting to measure or model the effects of
markets upon communities and the social goods
derived from them might also help to encourage
more modesty in economics (Johansson-Stenman
1998:302; McCloskey 2000c). Economics might-
thus become more open to “freedom of expression”
and “pluralist options” (Ackerman 2002:136;
Fullbrook 2001; Sent 2003, 2006), perhaps includ-
ing more exchange with neighboring disciplines
(sociology, social anthropology, political science),
rather than economics autarky.
Economists might then be inspired to explore
any possible negative social effects of market
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developments, and to help discover ways to counter
them, or at least to ameliorate them
 theoretically (Etzioni 1988; Etzioni and
Lawrence 1991);
 practically (Lifton 1993; Etzioni 1993/95, 1996;
Nathanson 1992: chs. 30-31; Bobbitt 2002);
 or both (Etzioni 1999; Frank 1999; Folbre 2001;
Nelson 2006),
not necessarily via the state alone, but possibly
utilizing market incentives.
Acknowledgement of the importance of com-
munities in themselves as well as for economics
could facilitate their reinforcement or reconstruc-
tion, which could have direct positive welfare
effects (via increased production of social goods)
as well as indirect positive effects (on markets and
government, via social capital). It might even help
with environmental problems, via improved com-
munity enforcement mechanisms (Ostrom 1990).
Acknowledging communities and social goods
in economics could also help the many proponents
of communities (who are often ideologically “anti-
market”) reciprocally acknowledge the important
role of markets in society.
Acknowledging the importance of communities
and social goods in economics would also help
economists to understand
 the transition from materialist to post-materialist
values (Wuthnow 1995); and
 from modernization to post-modernization
(Inglehart 1997); including
 the “paradox of affluence” revealed in the
comparative-happiness literature (Hirsch 1976:7;
Easterlin 1996; Cornish 1997; Haidt 2006:
143), i.e., why the “economistic fallacy” – “the
common belief that happiness is in some sense
proportionate to income” (Lane 2000:64) – fails.
It might then be easier for economists to under-
stand the issues of community, identity, and moral-
ity, which are involved, for example
 in protests against globalization (Rodrik 1997;
Stiglitz 2002, 2003:281-336);
 in Islamic fundamentalism (Qutb 1964; Friedman
1989:494, 2000; Barber 1995; Armstrong 2001;
Lindsey 2001); and even
 in the “moral politics” of recent domestic
(U.S.) culture wars (Lakoff 2002; Westen 2007).
Acknowledging communities and social goods in
economics could have other large benefits as well.
Boulding pithily described economic theory as
“the celestial mechanics of a non-existent world”
(Colander 1996:4), while Streeten (2004: 12) calls
economics “the science that argues from unwarranted
assumptions to foregone conclusions.” Acknowled-
ging all relevant assumptions more clearly and thor-
oughly, and describing their implications more
clearly (even if they make our systems less deter-
ministic), could reassure economics students – as
well as practitioners and students in related fields,
and the public – that we are concerned with reality,
not just with our imaginary models. This might help
dispel the alienation often associated with econom-
ics (Weisskopf 1971) and improve the communica-
tion of economic method and results (Mayer 2001).
Other methodological criticisms – as we saw above –
can also be understood as being rooted in the unac-
knowledged abstraction from communities and so-
cial goods, and might thus be ameliorated by such
an acknowledgment.
X. Appendix: While asserting generality,
welfare analysis with a perfectly
competitive market-equilibrium (Arrow
1983) does not explicitly abstract from
social goods, yet ignores them
1. The basic set-up and results
Kenneth Arrow (1983:69) offers this classic
summary of the conditions for a perfectly competi-
tive market-equilibrium:
 Households, possessing initial resources, possi-
bly including claims to the profits of firms,
choose consumption-bundles to maximize utility
at a given set of prices;
 firms choose production-bundles so as to maxi-
mize profits at the same set of prices; [and]
 the chosen production- and consumption-
bundles must be consistent with each other in
the sense that aggregate production plus initial
resources must equal aggregate consumption.
As Arrow makes clear, it is assumed in
this definition:
 that households and firms have full knowledge
of all prices;
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 that households and firms take the prices “as
given,” not alterable by their own actions;
 that prices are the same for all households and
firms; and
 that no resources are used in the act of charg-
ing prices.
Certain further assumptions are often used in
equilibrium analysis, including:
 convex indifference curves for the households;
 convex production possibility sets for the
firms; and
 the universality of markets.
Arrow (p. 70) defines universality of markets to
mean that “the consumption-bundle which deter-
mines the utility of an individual is the same as that
which he [sic] purchases at given prices subject to
his budget constraint. . .” In other words, all sources
of utility are purchasable in the market, “everything
that matters is a marketable commodity with a
meaningful price” (Ackerman 2008:280).
Pointing out that convexity is not necessary for
this step, Arrow (1983:70) then states the First
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics as:
“If [universality of markets] holds, [then] a com-
petitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient.” Pareto
efficiency, of course, means that no one can be
made better off without making someone else
worse off.
If we add convexity – and some assumption
of equality or justice in original resource-
endowments (which Arrow recognizes) – then we
seem to have arrived at the best of all possible
worlds: If everything of value is purchasable in per-
fectly competitive markets, then we’re all as well off
as we can possibly get.
2. Relaxing the universality-of-
markets assumption
Of course we do not have equality in original
resource-endowments (and, many would argue, not
justice either). It may also be that, rather than tak-
ing prices “as given,” some economic agents can
influence prices by their own actions. And certainly
we don’t each have full knowledge about all
prices. (Another assumption – which Arrow didn’t
find necessary to mention, but which often isn’t
fulfilled – is clearly-defined property rights, which
would seem to be a special case of the failure of
universality of markets, though quite different
from the one discussed here.) And there are public
goods which, for one reason or another, can’t be
sold in markets. But all these aspects have been
explored elsewhere at some length, and need not
detain us here. (Besides the theoretical literature
addressing these issues, practical political action
has been taken – to greater or lesser extent – to
correct the problems. Thus we may have income
transfers of various sorts to the poor, or the not-
so-poor; regulation or creation of monopolies;
agencies devoted to information collection and dis-
semination; and government provision of other
public goods.)
Relaxing the assumption of universality of
markets has also been explored somewhat. As
Arrow says (p. 72), “the bulk of meaningful future
transactions cannot be carried out on any existing
present market, so [the] assumption [of] the univer-
sality of markets is not valid.” Nevertheless, this
problem is commonly taken to have been overcome –
at least in a theoretical way – by the assumption
of Arrow-Debreu asset-markets, for which actual
asset-markets can give a reasonable approximation.
The impossibility of markets for social goods – and
thus the non-existence of such markets – has not
been explored, or even explicitly recognized.
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